University of Colorado Law School

Colorado Law Scholarly Commons
Resource Law Notes: The Newsletter of the
Natural Resources Law Center (1984-2002)

Newsletters

1-1986

Resource Law Notes Newsletter, no. 7, Jan. 1986
University of Colorado Boulder. Natural Resources Law Center

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/resource_law_notes
Part of the Energy and Utilities Law Commons, Energy Policy Commons, Environmental Law
Commons, Environmental Policy Commons, Indigenous, Indian, and Aboriginal Law Commons, Natural
Resources and Conservation Commons, Natural Resources Law Commons, Natural Resources
Management and Policy Commons, Oil, Gas, and Energy Commons, Oil, Gas, and Mineral Law Commons,
Public Policy Commons, Water Law Commons, and the Water Resource Management Commons

Citation Information
Resource Law Notes: The Newsletter of the Natural Resources Law Center, no. 7, Jan. 1986 (Natural Res.
Law Ctr., Univ. of Colo. Sch. of Law).

RESOURCE LAW NOTES: THE NEWSLETTER OF THE NATURAL
RESOURCES LAW CENTER, no. 7, Jan. 1986 (Natural Res.
Law Ctr., Univ. of Colo. Sch. of Law).
Reproduced with permission of the Getches-Wilkinson
Center for Natural Resources, Energy, and the
Environment (formerly the Natural Resources Law
Center) at the University of Colorado Law School.

Resource Law Notes

The Newsletter of the Natural Resources Law Center
University of Colorado, Boulder • School of Law

Colorado Water Program Held
Colorado Water Issues and Options: The 90’s and Beyond
provided the focus for a two-day conference held in Denver
on October 8 and 9,1985. The conference was cosponsored
by the Natural Resources Law Center and the Colorado
Water Resources Research Institute. The program attracted
290 participants.
David Getches led off with an overview of the issues facing
Colorado. Clyde Martz called for a study comparing the
Colorado system for handling water rights with other states.
Professor Stephen Williams advocated a market-oriented
approach for water allocation. At lunch, Ray Moses dis
cussed the historical development of Colorado water law.
Steve Shupe proposed an administrative system for improv
ing the efficiency of water use. William Paddock critiqued
the current state of nontributary groundwater administra
tion. The papers were discussed in three concurrent after
noon workshops—water administration, efficiency dis
incentives, and nontributary groundwater.

On the second day Jeris Danielson talked about plans for
augmentation. Glenn Porzak described two complex water
transfers in which he was recently involved. Professor Neil
Grigg discussed the benefits of cooperative water manage
ment. During the luncheon talk on the second day, Justice
George Lohr talked about the types of water issues that have
been decided by the Colorado Supreme Court in recent
years. Lee Rice described some of the hydrological and
engineering issues that arise in water rights proceedings.
Howard Holmes presented a thorough review of the legal
issues surrounding interstate transfers of water. Ken Wright
coauthored the paper. Again three concurrent workshops
were held in the afternoon—plans for augmentation, innova
tive water management, and interstate transfers.
The papers from these presentations will be the basis fora
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book on Colorado water law being prepared by the Natural
Resources Law Center. Portions of the workshop discus
sions also will be included.

Center Research Update
During 1985 the Center was involved in research in several
different areas. In August the Colorado Water Resources
Research Institute published “The Endangered Species Act
and Water Development Within the South Platte Basin”
(Completion Report No. 137). Authored by Larry MacDonnell with research assistance from second year law students
Laurie Lambrix and Gregg Renkes, this 122-page report
provides a detailed analysis of the Endangered Species Act
(ESA). The ESA seeks to provide federal protection to threat
ened and endangered plant and animal species. Section 7
prohibits any federal action jeopardizing the continued ex
istence of such species. In the West, virtually all water devel
opment and much land-based development is subject to
federal regulatory review. As a consequence, endangered
species considerations are a part of all such activities. Major
conclusions of the research are that, in spite of recent efforts
to narrow its application, the ESA has an extraordinarily
broad reach and that its potency for preventing development
should be redirected toward solutions that would enhance
the protection of endangered species. The full report may be
obtained from the Colorado Water Resources Research Insti
tute, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, Colorado
80523 for $6.
In October, Center fellow Steve Shupe presented the re
sults of his research on “The Problems and Promise of Im
proving Efficiency Under Western Water Law” to the Colo
rado Water Issues conference. His paper documents the
benefits that can result from efficiency improvements in
cluding salinity reduction, erosion control, reduced operat
ing costs as well as increased water availability. He dis
cusses the major impediments—costs, concerns about ad
verse effects in the downstream system, and legal barriers.
He offers a number of options for improving the efficiency of
water use encompassing both regulatory and marketoriented mechanisms. This paper will be included in the
book on Colorado water law now in preparation by the
Center.
In December the Center completed a report, “Guidelines
for Area of Origin Compensation.” Primary report authors
are Larry MacDonnell and Professor Charles Howe of the
economics department at the University of Colorado. Pro
fessor James Corbridge and Ashley Ahrens, a graduate stu
dent in economics, also contributed to the report. Although
the prior appropriation doctrine generally permits the diver
sion of water from its source to any location where it will be

tion problems, as well as variations in agricultural productiv
ity. Not every acre of land produces high yields, nor does
every acre produce pollution, but particular areas with spe
cific land uses often have particular problems. The national
problem is that there are a lot of “ local” problem areas in a lot
of states. Forty-six states have identified agriculture as a
problem or potential problem for water quality.
The mechanics of nonpoint pollution control are not mys
terious or unknown. We have sufficient technical abilities to
control movement of soil and chemicals into the water. But,
because we are dealing with people who manage land for a
living, there are social and economic factors that can get in
the way of installing the necessary “ Best Management Prac
tices” for pollution control. Often, the farmer may not agree,
or believe, that his land management is a problem. For ex
ample, in a soil erosion study in Missouri, ninety-three per
cent of the farmers questioned were concerned about soil
erosion, but only fifty-nine percent felt there was a problem
on their own land. Whether a farmer agrees that there is a
problem or not, the cost of solving the problem may stand in
the way of implementing a solution. There is some work
which shows that adoption of erosion control practices re
duces income. Even if the cost is manageable, returns may
be low and a long time in coming, and benefits may all be
off-site and of little or no immediate value to the operation.
Having outlined the nonpoint problem in agriculture, let us
take a look at one effort at a solution. In 1978, the state of
Wisconsin established a nonpoint source pollution abate
ment program. The keys to the program are state cost
sharing efforts, concentration on high-impact problem areas,
and local action to gain local response and cooperation.
A continuing statewide survey and evaluation process by
the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources identifies
“ priority watersheds” throughout the state to be the subjects
of intensive planning and support efforts. Watersheds are
selected on the basis of the severity of the problems in the
basin, the potential for improvement by reducing nonpoint
pollutant loads, the willingness of landowners and municipal
ities to participate, the willingness and ability of local agen
cies to carry out their roles, and the potential for general
public benefit from the project.
When a priority watershed is selected, a basin analysis
identifies water quality problems, significant nonpoint and
other pollution problem areas, reasonably achievable water
quality improvements, and management needs. Based on
this analysis, an implementation strategy defining tasks and
identifying local agencies for accomplishing the tasks is
developed. Overall administrative responsibility and alloca
tion of cost-share funds lies with the Department of Natural
Resources, but local project operations and administration
is the responsibility of local agencies. Usually, the local
agencies involved are the county Land Conservation Com
mittees. These committees are standing committees of the
county board that have replaced the Soil and Water Con
servation Districts. Local administration involves carrying
out basinwide information and education programs in coop
eration with the University of Wisconsin Extension Service,
arranging cost-share agreements with landowners, and de
signing Best Management Practice packages.
Pollution control in priority watersheds is not going to
happen immediately. State officials see an eight- to nineyear planning and implementation period in each watershed.
After the analysis and plan development, landowners and
municipalities have a three-year period in which to sign cost
share agreements, and a five-year period following that dur
ing which the practices are to be designed and installed. An

beneficially used—even out of the basin of origin, many
states have established some kind of legislative restrictions.
The objective of the research was to consider the ap
proaches that have been taken and to offer suggested guide
lines for such out-of-basin transfers. A survey of relevant
state laws is provided with special attention to Colorado’s
“ compensatory storage” provision. Economic principles
suggest that a transbasin diversion is desirable if it repre
sents the least cost source of water supply and if the result
ing benefits exceed the full costs. The report recommends
that the area of origin be compensated for costs associated
with such diversions. Copies of the report are available from
the Colorado Water Resources Research Institute or from
the Center.

Mastbaum to Be Center Fellow
David Mastbaum will be a Visiting Fellow at the Natural
Resources Law Center during the spring semester, 1986. His
research will focus on external stresses to national parks
posed by adjacent large-scale development.
Mr. Mastbaum is a graduate of the University of Michigan
Law School. In his more than 15 years of practice he has
been involved in litigation on a broad number of issues.
Much of his work has involved environmental and energy
matters. Between 1975 and 1981 he was a senior attorney
with the Environmental Defense Fund in the Denver and
Berkeley offices.

Land Use and Water Quality:

Thoughts About Nonpoint
Source Pollution Control
by N. Earl Spangenberg
Extracts from a “brown bag” session, November 7, 1985, by
N. Earl Spangenberg, Visiting Fellow, NRLC. Mr. Spangen
berg is Associate Professor, College of Natural Resources,
University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point.
In 1972, Congress started us on a serious effort to clean up
the country’s lakes, streams, rivers and reservoirs. Today,
after thirteen years, we can see cleaner water, but we can
also see that we still have a way to go. Continued progress is
going to lie less with cleaning up the way we use water, and
more with cleaning up the way we use the land. Almost
ninety-five percent of the daily sediment loading, and sev
enty to ninety percent of the daily nutrient loading in the
nation’s waters comes from surface and subsurface runoff
which carries the detritus from land use in agriculture and
forestry, in mining and construction, and in urban land use.
Federal legislation attempted to address these “ nonpoint
source” problems by mandating areawide waste treatment
management planning processes in the Clean Water Act, but
we have yet to develop strategies to effectively handle the
problems on a nationwide basis.
The biggest of the nonpoint source problems is agricul
tural land use. Variations in topography, soils and climate
result in variations in the severity and distribution of pollu
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important feature of the agreements is that they aim toward
comprehensive control by prescribing all the Best Manage
ment Practices for a particular farm or municipality. A partic
ipant must agree to an entire suite of practices for pollution
control, rather than choosing to install some practices while
ignoring others of less direct benefit or profit.
Cost sharing for eligible practices ranges from fifty to
seventy percent, depending on the on-site benefits and the
relation of the practice to customary operating procedures.
Contour cropping and reduced tillage are examples of eligi
ble practices in the low cost-share range, while shoreline
protection and settling basins are examples of eligible prac
tices in the higher support range.
The priority watershed program is new in Wisconsin.
Since its inception in 1978, twenty-six basins have been
identified as priority watersheds. Currently, only two have
finished the sign-on period and are into the installation
phase. Interim accomplishments indicate that significant
gains will have been accomplished by the end of the project.
However, because some landowners chose not to partici
pate, there will still be subwatersheds with significant local
problems. State officials have noted that although the volun
tary program will achieve between fifty and seventy percent
reduction in pollution loading, regulatory mechanisms must
be considered to accomplish higher levels of pollution con
trol in some situations.
The nonpoint control program in Wisconsin has shown
that a state program of cost sharing and targeted funding
administered at the state level, but carried into action at the
local level has the power and flexibility to achieve significant
results with landowner cooperation. It has also shown that
an entirely voluntary program will probably never reach
uniformly high levels of pollution control, and that some sort
of regulatory program may need to be considered.
The Wisconsin experience seems to say that probable
elements of success in a nonpoint source control program
will include local control, state financial support, targeting of
critical areas for efficient fund use, and opportunity for vol
untary participation backed by some sort of regulatory goad
to move the recalcitrant. It would be folly to suggest that this
formula would work everywhere, but it presents a pattern
worth thinking about in those places where nonpoint source
pollution is a significant water quality problem.

Compromise Is Not a Dirty Word:

Environmental Negotiating
in an Imperfect World
By Cecil D. Andrus
Cecil D. Andrus was the Natural Resources Law Center's
Distinguished Visitor in September, 1985. Mr. Andrus served
as the governor of Idaho between 1971 and 1977. From 1977
to 1981 he was Secretary of the Interior. Among his many
accomplishments during this tenure, he led the effort to set
aside large areas in Alaska for national parks, wildlife re
fuges, wild and scenic rivers, and national forest lands. Rec
ognizing the need for balanced development on public
lands, he was instrumental in reinstituting the federal coal
leasing program.
The following remarks are taken from a public presenta
tion at the University of Colorado School of Law on Sep
tember 26, 1985.
It is a great honor for a nonlawyer like me to be named
Natural Resources Distinguished Visitor at the Law School.
The remarks I’ll make about law and natural resources are
intended for everyone who is concerned enough about our
natural heritage of land, air, and water to participate in decid
ing how that heritage will be used.
The Role of Compromise
I want to talk to you today about compromise. To many of
us, that word has a slightly sinister overtone. We speak of a
person or a company being put in a “compromising position"
because of some embarrassing disclosures. We even go so
far as to say that a young woman’s virtue has been “com
promised,” implying that compromise is really a surrender to
superior and maybe immoral force.
In some Islamic countries, there really is no good transla
tion for the word “compromise.” You’ll recall the agonized
and lengthy negotiations between the United States and Iran
in 1979 and 1980 over the hostages from the American Em
bassy. Part of the problem in working out an agreement for
their safe release came from the way the Iranians perceived
the word “compromise.”
In their language, it means “to surrender in a weak or
immoral way,” as in our example about the young woman’s
virtue. Imagine the hostility generated in Iran when an Amer
ican negotiator announced publicly that he expected Iran to
“compromise” by releasing the hostages.
But in our language,
compromise has strong
positive meanings . . . and
it’s those meanings that I
want to explore with you
here.
In my current business
as an adviser to various
companies on natural re
sources issues, I am always
searching for ways in which
people who disagree can
negotiate a compromise
that satisfies both their
interests.
. . com prom ise has strong
In my former incarnation
positive meanings.”
as a public servant, my
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can’t put a dollar figure on
but pinch the client just as
badly. They also know too
well the risks of civil litiga
tion, which is too much like
gambling to be predictable
and too much like a duel to
be fun. Seldom in my expe
rience as a client are there
any true winners after a
long court struggle.
The litigation process
produces a decision from
“. . . a lengthy court case is a
the judge. It’s like Jupiter
poo r way to resolve a good
thundered from the heav
fa ith dispute between tw o or
ens. You’ve either won or
m ore parties.”
you’ve lost—that’s it. The
decision was not in your client’s hands, but rather in the
hands of someone who doesn’t know the special needs or
concerns of you and your adversary nearly as well as you
know them yourself. Wouldn’t it have been more satisfying to
have played a part in shaping the final outcome, rather than
to have accepted the judge’s ruling like a contestant in a
beauty pageant?

major tool was compromise. Politics, as someone once ob
served, is the art of the possible. You only achieve in politics
and government as much as your opponents will p e rm it. . .
and never as much as your friends hope for. That’s why the
solutions that we devise to the various problems we all wres
tle with are always compromises. Maybe that’s how al I pol iticians see themselves . . . as problem-solvers.
In my experience it’s a rare fight that couldn’t have been
avoided if all of the participants had strained to the utmost to
hammer out a creative and satisfactory compromise. What
often happens during the course of negotiations is that you
realize that the other side’s principles, interests, and—yes,
even arguments—are as valid and deeply held as your own.
Out of that discord and negotiating process can grow a new
respect for your adversary which will stand you in good
stead the next time you disagree.
Environmental Accomplishments
In the past twenty years in America, we have achieved a
great deal. The Wilderness Bill was passed. So was the Clean
Water Act and the Clean Air Act. The Environmental Pro
tection Agency was created. The Land and Water Conserva
tion Fund was established, and we passed the Alaska Lands
Bill, which protected more land than any legislation in his
tory. The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act was passed, and we
succeeded in protecting for our children and their children
many of the crown jewels in America.
Each of these laws was a compromise between people of
strongly held principles. No one got all he wanted out of
those laws, but everyone who participated in their passage
got something that was important. Even though the conser
vationists didn’t get all they wanted in any of these particular
acts, they got something very important: the chance to
shape the decisions that we make about our natural
resources.

The Lawyer’s Task: Creative Counseling
As I see it, your task as a natural resources lawyer is to be a
wise counselor. You must train yourself to see all apects of
the problem and advise your client realistically. Only after
you have explored the client’s problem thoroughly from all
angles should you begin to play the advocate.
But once you don the advocate’s clothes, you owe it to
your client and to the decision-making system to press his
positions vigorously.
I’ve often noticed that a cl ient comes to a lawyer for advice
only when he has already locked himself into a position.
That’s why you must train yourself to explore an issue from
all perspectives, including your adversary's. The more you
can perceive the interests that your client shares with his
adversary, the easier it will be to adjust their dispute.
I’ve also often detected a tendency on the part of clients—
and I’ve been one often enough to know—to hear only what
they want you to say. Your duty is to tell them the bad with
the good.

The Dilemma: When to Fight and When to Settle
As I see it, the conservation movement faces a dilemma
caused by its very successes over the past fifteen years. On
one hand, there should be some justifiable pride over the
victories that have been won. Although economic develop
ment is on everyone’s mind these days because of the de
pression we find ourselves in, surveys continually report that
environmental protection is as popular as ever. The Gallup
poll has concluded that the goals of environmental protec
tion are shared as widely as any political idea in modern
American history.
The outrage that greeted Jim Watt’s and Anne Gorsuch’s
campaigns to gut federal environmental management pro
grams showed just how much a part of the mainstream the
values of the conservation movement have become.
But there’s the dilemma: the more procedures we’ve estab
lished to ensure procedural due process in environmental
decision-making, the harder it’s become to make any deci
sion at all. Now that any interest group can be heard, it takes
just a couple of well-organized special interests to impede
the wishes of the majority.

Conclusion
We in the environmental movement have grown up in the
past fifteen years. We have created lasting monuments that
protect our wild lands and waters. We have established a
rational system for deciding how to manage our scarce
national resources in the future. In the public’s mind, the
hard job of conservation is over.
But you know that the real work is just beginning. We must
continue to improve the decision-making process so that we
can realize the ideals of the conservation pioneers as well as
satisfy the needs for balanced growth.
We must act as responsible stewards of our national heri
tage of land, water, and air. We cannot preserve every rock or
tree, but we must not mindlessly consume all of our natural
resources and rob future generations of their rightful legacy
to the same aesthetic pleasures and economic opportunities
we’ve enjoyed. We must strike a balance between these two
extremes.

The Challenge: Advocacy Toward Problem Solving
The practicing lawyers in the audience will understand
why I say that a lengthy court case is a poor way to resolve a
good faith dispute between two or more parties. They know
the costs, both the ones measured in dollars and the ones you
4

ments and impact statements when significant federal ac
tions were being proposed or considered (42 U.S.C. § 4332).
Partly as a result of the paperwork explosion brought
about by NEPA compliance and FLPMA mandated land use
planning but also partly in response to outside political in
fluences and internal policy changes, the decision-making
process of both the Department and BLM have generally
become more complex and convoluted over the past fifteen
years. This has sometimes made the Department and BLM
appear “ muscle bound” or as if they had become entangled
in their own paperwork and procedural underwear. A further
complication is that BLM actions and decisions have also
become much more controversial and subject to litigative
challenge. In practical terms, this combination of events and
forces has dictated major changes in the manner in which
federal mineral leases are issued and administered.

Stipulations in Mineral Leasing Act Leases:

Power to Spare or
Spare Power?
By John R. Little, Jr.
Jack Little is an attorney with the
Denver office of Duncan, Weinberg &
Miller. He was formerly Regional Solici
tor, Rocky Mountain Region, and Asso
ciate Solicitor, Energy and Resources, of
the Department of the Interior. The fol
lowing article is a development of part of
his presentation on ‘‘Lands Available for
Mineral Leasing” at the June 1985 Con
ference on Public Lands Mineral Leas
ing: Issues and Directions.

Increased Use of Lease Stipulations
One of the major consequences of all of these changes in
emphasis is that BLM is more frequently utilizing stipula
tions as a means of executing their land use planning and
management determinations in a wide array of contexts,
including Leasing Act leases. To be fair, it should also be
noted that the Department and BLM are under heavy pres
sure to extensively stipulate, particularly by environmental
groups and state and local authorities. These interests
argue, for example, that leases should contain provisions
requiring that the Department attempt to enforce state and
local legal requirements as lease conditions or clauses requir
ing lessees to address and/or provide for remote off-site
socioeconomic impacts of lease development on the com
munity generally such as the costs of roads, schools, water
supply, sewers, law enforcement and the like. See Pring,
Power to Spare: Conditioning Federal Resource Leases to
Protect Social, Economic and Environmental Values, 14 Nat.
Res. Law 305 (1981); Barry, The Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977 and the Office of Surface Mining:
Moving Targets or Immovable Objects, 27A Rocky Mtn. L.
Found. 169, 320-24 (1982).
A further complication is that stipulations are also appear
ing more often in post-lease, administrative decisions such
as approvals of Applications for Permission to Drill, or min
ing or operation plans. When such conditions impose signif
icant cost-increasing requirements, questions are raised as
to whether fundamental post-award alterations of the lease
terms are authorized.
Lastly, there exists a rather virulent virus in the Depart
ment of the Interior that, in its most extreme form, holds that
there are virtually no limits to the Department’s authority to
stipulate as to almost anything, at any time in the pro ce sson or off-site.
Given all of these sometimes conflicting currents and
cross currents, it is clearly evident not only why stipulations
to Mineral Leasing Act leases are increasingly employed by
BLM but also why their pervasive use has become increas
ingly controversial, particularly when they address remote,
off-site impacts, when they are attached post-lease or, when
ever imposed, they cause substantially increased costs of
exploration, development or operation.

Red tape and fine print are as much a part of the average
American’s perception of their government as the Washing
ton Monument and Lincoln Memorial are central to their
minds-eye vision of the District of Columbia. It may, there
fore, seem incongruous to suggest that mineral lease stipu
lations—the very essence of government fine print—may
rapidly be becoming among the most controversial aspects
of the administration of the venerable Mineral Leasing Act of
1920. However, a few moments reflection will suggest that
although Leasing Act leases have historically contained a lot
of verbiage, most of this has simply executed the statute and
the regulations or has provided for housekeeping details. As
such, most of the provisions in the average lease have not
been of major independent, economic or operational signifi
cance to either the lessor or lessee. It is the author’s view that
this is no longer the case and that stipulations are now much
more important to lessor and lessees because they are be
coming more pervasive in addressing not only on-lease activi
ties but alleged off-site impacts as well.
Changes in Public Land Management
In significant part, this recent increase in the use of lease
conditions is merely a reflection of a gradual but substantial
change in the self-perceived role of the Bureau of Land
Management in the past decade and a half. The Department
of the Interior and its constituent General Land Office were
established originally as the instruments of execution of the
early policies of encouragement of settlement and disposal
of the public lands. Beginning about the time of passage of
the Taylor Grazing Act in 1934 (43 U.S.C. § 315 et seq.),
however, the Department and the BLM gradually began to
think of themselves more as land use planners and managers
than as disposers of the public lands. This change in philo
sophy was confirmed in the Federal Land Policy and Man
agement Act of 1976 (FLPMA), which stated clearly that the
remaining public lands were to be retained in federal owner
ship and managed on a multiple use and sustained yield
basis unless there were substantial reasons in the national
interest that required the disposal of a particular tract. (43
U.S.C. § 1701.) Section 202 of the Act also required that BLM
expand its prior management practices through the estab
lishment of an extensive land use planning system as to
these retained lands. (43 U.S.C. § 1712.) Six years earlier,
Congress had passed the National Environmental Policy Act,
which required the preparation of environmental assess

Statutory Authority
What is the statutory base for inserting conditions in min
eral leases? The answer is that it is essentially sparse and
very general in nature. For purposes of contrast, attention is
drawn to Section 505 of FLPMA (43 U.S.C. § 1765) relating to
grants of rights of way, which contains a very broad state
5

ment of authority for stipulations including, among other
things, minimizing damage to scenic and esthetic values or
otherwise protecting the environment, compliance with
State public health, safety, environmental and siting stand
ards and protecting the public interest in lands adjacent to
the right of way. The Acquired Lands Mineral Leasing Act
(30 U.S.C. § 352) also contains a specific direction that
leases issued thereunder shall be “ . . . subject to such condi
tions as the . . . [managing agency] . . . shall prescribe to
insure the adequate utilization of the lands for the primary
purposes for which they have been acquired or are being
administered.”
The analysis of the authority to stipulate under the 1920
Act starts with Section 17 (30 U.S.C. § 226[a]), which states
that public lands “may be leased by the Secretary.” The
second is Section 32 (30 U.S.C. § 189) which authorizes the
Secretary to promulgate “ necessary and proper” rules and
regulations providing for administration of the Act and
leases issued thereunder. Thirdly, Section 30 (30 U.S.C. §
187) requires that each lease shall contain provisions relating
to diligence and care of operations; hours, wages, condi
tions of employment, and safety and welfare of miners and
minors; prevention of undue waste; sale at reasonable
prices; prevention of monopoly; “ protection of the interests
of the United States” ; and “safeguarding the public welfare.”
Obviously, these two latter, very general provisions suggest
little in the way of guidance to either lessee or administrator
as to the permissible scope of stipulation. What other argu
able sources of authority are there?

There also should be noted a further provision which may
cast some doubt upon the argument for stipulations address
ing remote, off-site socioeconomic impacts. This is 30
U.S.C. § 191 which gives 50 percent of the Government’s Mineral
Leasing Act revenues to state and local governments. Some
of the legislative history of this provision suggests that it was
intended to be the federal contribution to local governments
for the impact of federal mineral development. See e.g. 50
Cong. Rec. 7769, 7773-4 (1919) H.R. Rep. No. 94-681, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1975), 1976 U.S. Code & Congressional
Adm. News at 1955.
Where Are We Headed?
With this background there are several points that should
be made. First, the days of automatic lessee acceptance of
any lease stipulations that someone in BLM might dream up
are over, in part because of increased lessee awareness of
stipulation authority issues. We can consequently expect
much more dispute and litigation on the subject. Second, the
internal and external pressure on BLM to extensively stipu
late to address issues raised during NEPA compliance or
the FLPMA land use planning process will continue. Third,
with the depressed state of the coal market, disputes and
litigation about the closely related issues as to the scope of
permissible charges in coal lease stipulation during the read
justment process under Section 7 of the Act (30 U.S.C. §
207), as amended by FCCLA in 1976 will continue. See e.g.
Coastal States Energy Co., 7 0 IBLA 386 (1984), appeal pend
ing Coastal States Energy Co. v. Watt, C 83-0730 J (C.D.
Utah, filed 6/3/83).
Beyond these relatively easy predictions, since there has
been very little case law on the subject, it is anyone’s guess
how the law will come out after the litigation is over. Never
theless, the author will be foolhardy enough to suggest some
thoughts which he believes are likely to be featured in future
decisions on the subject.
First, there are limits to how far the “ protection of the
interests of the United States” and “safeguarding the public
interest” language of Section 30 of the statute can be
stretched. Unless Congress can be persuaded to broaden
and expand the present BLM authority base along the lines
of Section 505 of FLPMA or the Acquired Lands Act section
previously noted, many of the requirements that are finding
their way into leases at present do not have reasonable
linkage to protection of legitimate federal on-site interests or
a specific statutory or regulatory authorizations may not be
sustained. We are beginning to see some of this from the
IBLA already. See e.g. Blackhawk Coal Co., 68 IBLA 96
(1982); Gulf Oil Corp. et al., 73 IBLA 328 (1983); Coastal
States Energy Co., 81 IBLA 171 (1984); and, Sunoco Energy
Dev. Co., 84 IBLA 131 (1984).
Second, if stipulations are soundly related to site specific
physical conditions, are not overly heavy handed or unreas
onable, they probably will be enforced.
Third, excessive stipulations which substantially limit or
prevent operations are likely to be challenged. As an exam
ple, attention is called to the several thousand leases that have
been issued by Interior within BLM Wilderness Study Areas
being administered under FLPMA section 603(c) with no
surface occupancy stipulations. While isolated instances of
this practice might be justified on the basis of site-specific
facts (such as the possible ability to develop a particular
tract by slant drilling or a need to block up acreage, or the
like), it is hard to justify widespread leasing on a “giving with
the right-taking away with the left” basis even if the “take it or
leave it,” contract-based justification is swallowed whole. It

Other Sources of Authority
First, there is the “ broad discretion of the Secretary.” See
Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965). This, of course, is yet
another of those favorite refuges of scoundrels and Interior
Solicitors akin to apple pie, the stars and stripes or even, “the
check is in the mail.” Yet “ broad discretion” clearly has to be
reckoned as a further, partial source of authority at least.
The second derives from “broad discretion.” This is that
leasing with stipulations is a lesser, included power implicit
in the concept of discretion, i.e. in lieu of refusing to lease.
The third is the precept that a lease is a contract and the
lessee has the option to either accept or refuse the lease as
stipulated.
A fourth is that stipulations are a proper method of the
exercise of the very broad, sovereign power of the Secretary
to regulate uses of the public lands. See Kleppe v. New
Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
A fifth is that stipulations are simply a form of regulation
authorized by 30 U.S.C. § 189. (Seee.g. 43 C.F.R. §§ 3101.1
and 3101.1-2.)
A sixth is that they are authorized by the NEPA provision
that requires that existing federal policies, regulations and
statutes be construed as to sanction reasonable provisions
for environmental protection. See 42 U.S.C. § 332. But this
NEPA direction to broadly construe has been held to be
limited in scope as applied to Mineral Leasing Act actions.
See, Natural Resource Defense Council v. Berklund, 609 F.
2d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
Beyond this there are also a number of specific statutes
and regulations that purport to authorize use regulation to
varying degrees such as: wild and scenic rivers (16 U.S.C. §
1280 [a]); designated wilderness areas (16 U.S.C. §
1133[d] [3]); BLM wilderness study areas (43 U.S.C. § 1782);
endangered species (16 U.S.C. § 1531 et. seq.)\ and recrea
tion areas administered by the National Park Service (36
C.F.R. Part 9).
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is suggested that the issuance of such leases may, in fact, be
a perversion of discretion since it would seem doubtful that
they convey any interest in the land and are thus mere shells.
Perhaps the Department should not issue a lease rather than
promulgate one that is arguably a sham. It was therefore
interesting to see that the Department recently adopted 43
C.F.R. § 3101.1-2 which says, in part, that mineral leases will
be issued only if the stipulations will not absolutely bar
exploration of the resource and extraction is technically
feasible. But then, the regulation adds: “or the lease, as stipu
lated, is acceptable to the lessee.” Some read Conner v.
Burford, 605 F. Supp. 107 (D.C. Mont. 1985); Sierra Club v.
Peterson, 717 F. 2d § 409 (Ca. D.C. 1983); and, Rocky Moun
tain Oil and Gas Assn. v. Watt, 696 F. 2d 734 (10th Cir. 1983)
as supporting the general use of no surface occupancy
stipulations. This construction of these cases is unconvinc
ing to the author.
Fourth, as to general socioeconomic clauses, unless they
are simply reflections of provisions generally applicable (e.g.
nondiscrimination in employment) or can be shown to have
a solid nexus to a specific statutory base, they may be in
trouble. As a specific example of these socioeconomic
issues, the fascinating subject of cultural-historical-archeo
logical resource survey and preservation stipulations comes
to mind. While it is tempting to deal with the subject in detail,
it will suffice to suggest that unless there is strong evidence
that the bones of General Custer or some historical, cultural
or archeological find of similar dignity are located on the
lease premises, there is little obvious legal justification for a
pervasive stipulation requiring, for example, the employ
ment of a full-time archeologist on site for the complete lease
term or a full, pre-drilling cultural-historical survey of the
entire lease tract. Certainly, there are good and sufficient
reasons to require lessees to take reasonable steps to iden
tify and protect these kinds of resources if they are found on
the public domain. The trouble is that these legitimate objec
tives have been prostituted by overextension, largely by the
professional in and out-house historical-archeological lobby.
The Act (§ 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act, 16
U.S.C. § 470f) merely says that the Agency head shall “take
into account the effect” of any federal undertaking on any
historical site or structure included or eligible for inclusion
on the Register and shall give the Advisory Council the
opportunity to “comment” on such undertakings. See also
Executive Order 11593 (May 13,1971) and 36 C.F.R. Part 800.
It is thus very difficult for the author at least to see how the
Act authorizes a requirement that a lessee must develop the
evidence as to whether or not there is a historic site or
structure on the lease so that it can be nominated, accepted
on the Register, commented upon and then be “taken into
account.”
Fifth, the more tenuous and distant the nexus between the
authorizing statute and the stipulation, the greater the risk of
it being upset in litigation.
Sixth, the less stipulations address physical on-site condi
tions and the more they are concerned with off-site matters,
the greater chance the lessee has of successful challenge.
The supporters of a more liberal reading of the Secretary’s
stipulation authority find comfort in National Res. Defense
Council v. Berklund, 609 F. 2d 5531 (D.C. Cir. 1980) and
Sierra Club v. Peterson, supra. While it isgranted that there is
some language in both cases suggesting that use of stipula
tions may be a way of dealing with issues raised in the NEPA
process, it is the author’s view that the cases are being
overread if interpreted much farther than that.
Seventh, since the lease is a contract, overaggressive

postlease administrative actions may give rise to breach
damages or injunctive relief. The cited cases resulting from
the 1969 "blow out" in the Santa Barbara channel clearly
suggest that there are limits to the postlease power of the
Secretary to regulate, particularly if such stipulations cause
major postlease cost increases or unreasonable delay. See
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Morton, 493 F. 2d 141 (9th Cir. 1973); Union
Oil Co. of Calif, v. Morton, 512 F. 2d 743 (9th Cir. 1975); and
Sun Oil Corp. v. United States, 572 F. 2d 786 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
Eighth, there are limits to the Secretary’s implied sover
eign powers to regulate land uses. Specifically, DOI should
be concerned about instances where the Secretary has, with
his discretionary leasing hat on, issued coal leases for lands
that are only suitable for surface mining development and
has then, with his zoning, land use, regulatory or sovereignty
hat on, designated them unsuitable for surface mining or as
unmineable alluvial valley floors under SMCRA. The recent
Whitney Benefits case strongly suggests that this sort of
power must be exercised with caution and restraint. Whitney
Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 752 F. 2d 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
Last, leaving aside any consideration of the kinds of dual
sovereignty issues arising out of arguments as to the mean
ing of Ventura County v. Gulf Oil Corp., 601 F. 2d 1080 (9th
Cir. 1979) affd. 445 U.S. 947 (1980), there are serious legal
and policy concerns with the assertion that violations of
state and local laws and regulations should be reasons for
assessment of federal civil penalties or cancellation of fed
eral leases. It would not seem to be a seemly posture for the
United States to, in effect, “throw its weight around” by
attempting to enforce state and local tax laws, state or local
roadway load limits, local zoning laws, or the like. State and
local governmental units have plenty of enforcement
weapons and abundant power to tax already. They don’t
need Uncle Sam to do their enforcement for them.
Summing up, the use of stipulations is a most reasonable,
effective, efficient and straightforward method of exercising
the wide range of legitimate discretion which the law ac
cords to the Secretary under the 1920 Act. The trouble is that
there seem to be many, both in and out of the Department of
the Interior, who erroneously view the authority to stipulate
as being essentially unlimited in time and scope and who
have attempted to use stipulations as a way of “deal ing with”
a lot of peripheral or remote problems or to feather their own
parochial policy nests. In my judgment, in so doing, they
have at times overreached the reasonable Iimits of the Secre
tary’s authority base. To this point, these indiscretions have
gone largely unchallenged because lessees have swallowed
hard, have rejected the expense, delay and hassle of litiga
tion, and have grudgingly accepted the stipulations. Those
days are over, in my view.

The Natural Resources Law Center
The Natural Resources Law Center was established at the
University of Colorado School of Law in the fall of 1981.
Building on the strong academ ic base in natural resources
already existing in the Law School and the University, the
C enter’s purpose is to facilitate research, publication, and
education related to natural resources law.
For inform ation about the Natural Resources Law Center
and its programs, contact:
Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Director
Katherine Taylor, Executive Assistant
Fleming Law Building
Boulder, Colorado 80309-0401
Telephone: (303) 492-1286

7

Publications and Materials of the
Natural Resources Law Center
Books
• Special Water Districts: Challenge for the Future,
James N. Corbridge, ed. Book containing edited papers from the
workshop on Special Water Districts, Sept. 11-13, 1983. $15.
Conference Materials
• Western Water Law in Transition, 415-page notebook of outlines
and materials from 3-day, June 1985 conference. $60.
• Public Lands Mineral Leasing: Issues and Directions, 472-page
notebook of outlines and materials from 2-day, June 1985 con
ference. $40.
• Management of National Forests in the Rocky Mountains, 130 page
notebook of outlines and materials from 1-day, March 1985 forum.
$15.
• The Federal Impact on State Water Rights, 365 page notebook of
outlines and materials from 3 day, June 1984 conference. $60.
• The Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 350 page notebook
of outlines and materials from 3 day, June 1984 conference. $60.
• Groundwater: Allocation, Development and Pollution, 450 page
notebook of outlines and materials from 4-day, June 1983 water
law short course. $55.
• New Sources of Water for Energy Development and Growth: Inter
basin Transfers,
645 page notebook of outlines and materials from 4-day, June 1982
water law short course. $55.
Occasional Papers
• “ The Rights of Communities: A Blank Space in American Law,”
Joseph L. Sax, Professor of Law, University of Michigan. NRLC
Occasional Papers Series. 16 pgs. $2.50.
• “ Nuisance and the Right of Solar Access,”
Adrian Bradbrook, Reader in Law, University of Melbourne,
Australia. NRLS Occasional Papers Series. 54 pps. $5.
• “ Tortious Liability for the Operation of Wind Generators,”
Adrian Bradbrook, Reader in Law, University of Melbourne,
Australia. NRLC Occasional Papers Series. 74 pps. $5.
• “ The Access of Wind to Wind Generators,” Adrian Bradbrook,
Reader in Law, University of Melbourne, Australia. NRLC Occa
sional Papers Series. 77 pps. $5.
Research Reports
• “ The Endangered Species Act and Water Development Within the
South Platte Basin,” Lawrence J. MacDonnell. Colorado Water
Resources Research Institute (Completion Report No. 137). $6.
• “ Guidelines for Developing Area-of-Origin Compensation,”
Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Charles W. Howe, James N. Corbridge,
W. Ashley Ahrens. NRLC Research Report Series. 70 pps. $5.
Reprints
• “ Implied Covenants in Oil and Gas Leases” reprint of two articles

Resources Law Notes
Natural Resources Law Center
U niversity of C olorado
School of Law
Boulder, C olorado 80309-0401

by Stephen F. Williams, Professor of Law, University of Colorado.
40 pages. $4.50.
Audio Tapes
• Western Water Law in Transition, cassette tapes of speakers’
presentations. Full 3 days—$150. Half-day segments—$35 each.
• Public Land Mineral Leasing: Issues and Directions, cassette tapes of
speakers' presentations. Full 2 days—$100. Half-day segments—$35
each.
Newsletter
• Resource Law Notes is available without charge. Write or call the
Center to add your name to the mailing list.

Natural Resources Law Center Advisory Board
Clyde O. Martz, Esq., Chairman
Davis, Graham & Stubbs, Denver.
John U. Carlson, Esq.
Stanley Dempsey, Esq., Arnold
& Porter, Denver.
Guy R. Martin, Esq., Perkins,
Coie, Stone, Olsen & Williams,
Washington D.C.
Professor Ruth Maurer,
Associate Professor of Mineral
Economics, Colorado School of
Mines.
Charles J. Meyers, Esq.,
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher,
Denver.
Raphael Moses, Esq., Moses,
Wittemyer, Harrison & Woodruff,
Boulder.
Laurence I. Moss, Consultant,
Estes Park.
Robert Pasque, Esq., Manager
of Lands, Cities Service
Corporation.
David P. Phillips, Esq.,
Executive Director, Rocky
Mountain Mineral Law
Foundation.
Professor Robert E. Sievers,
Director, Cooperative Institute for
Research in Environmental
Sciences (CIRES), University of
Colorado.
Professor Ernest E. Smith,
Professor and former Dean,
University of Texas School of
Law.

Leo N. Smith, Esq., Molloy, Jones,
Donahue, Trachta, Childers &
Mallamo, Tucson.
Professor A. Dan Tarlock, Professor
of Law, Chicago/Kent Law School,
Illinois Institute of Technology.
John G. Welles, Regional
Administrator, Environmental
Protection Agency, Region VIII.
Professor Gilbert F. White, Professor
Emeritus of Geography, University
of Colorado.
Marvin Wolf, Esq., Wolf Energy
Company, Denver.
Representative Ruth M. Wright,
Colorado House of Representatives.
Faculty Advisory Committee
Betsy Levin, Dean, University of
Colorado, School of Law.
James N. Corbridge, Jr., Professor
of Law.
David H. Getches, Associate
Professor of Law (on leave).
Executive Director, State of
Colorado Department of Natural
Resources.
Stephen F. Williams, Professor of
Law.

N o n p ro fit
O rganization
U.S. POSTAGE

PAID
Boulder, Colo.
Perm it No. 257

